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THE POWER OF THE KENTUCKY COURTS TO
DISREGARD PROVISIONS OF THE CODE
In 1902, under the provisions of sections 738 and 740 of
the Code1 which provide that the appeal will be dismissed
unless appellant file the transcript in the office of the Clerk
of the Court of Appeals at least twenty days before the first
day of the second term of the Court next after the granting of
the appeal, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in an action
contesting a primary election regarding the docketing of a case
at the time filed so as to give it an advanced and immediate
hearing, said that in order to give it a speedy hearing to which
appellants were entitled under a fair construction of the
election statute2 the Court is authorized and required to docket
the case whenever filed without regard to the time the trans-
cript is filed in the clerk's office.3
There the Court of Appeals did not comply with the Code,
basing its decision on a fair construction of the election statute.
Had the Court abided by the Code the party receiving the
judgment would have been delayed several months in getting
his name certified as having won the primary election.
In September 1913, the Court purported to construe the
Code4 in the case of Prce v RusselP so as to allow the decision
of the Court to become final prior to the thirty day delay re-
quired by the Code. Thus appellee was enabled to get his
name certified before the general election in November.
Clark v Robmnson, G decided in 1914, held that the mandate
'KENTUCKY CODES (Carroll, 1938) sec. 738 and 740.
KENTUCKY STATUTES (Thum's Supp., 1915) sec. 1565 cc.
'Graham v Graham, 113 Ky 743, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 20, 67 S.W
1004 (1902)
4
KENTUCKY CODES (Carroll, 1938) sec. 760: "1. The Court of
Appeals may make rules for the convenient dispatch of business,
the preservation of order, the argument of cases or motions, and the
manner and time of presenting motions or petitions for rehearing,
therein; and the time for issuing its mandates and decisions, and the
mode of enforcing its mandates and orders, and may change the
same: Provided, That no mandate shall issue, nor decision become
final, until after thirty days, excluding Sundays, from the day on
which the decision is rendered, unless the court, in delay cases,
otherwise direct;
1 154 Ky 824, 159 S.W 573 (1913).
'159 Ky 33, 166 S.W 801 (1914).
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of the Court may be issued immediately when, in the judgment
of the Court, this is necessary for the public interest or to pre-
vent great injury Tins decision is in regard to section 760
of the Code, as was the decision in Price v Russell.
These three decisions hinge on the purported construction
placed oii the. Code by the Court 7 and in no wise state that
authority exists for completely disregarding the code section
concerned.
However, in Burton v Mayer s the Court, in considering
section 760 of the Code. abandoned the zrounds on which the
previous cases on tins point were decided (namely, a fair
construction of that section) and held flatly that the Code
could be disregarded where the rules of practice are unworkable.
In such cases the Court held it could draw upon its inherent
power to carry out the purposes of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky., which provides that all judicial
power shall be vested in the courts, 9 since the rules of practice
and procedure are, therefore, within the judicial power and
subject to the control of the courts.
Chief Justice Stites in his opinion said, "Rules of practice
and procedure are, fundamentally, matters within the control
of the courts in the administration of justice. The courts accept
legislative co-operation in rendering the judiciary more effective.
They deny the right of legislative dominaice in matters of this
kind. ,o
And again in the opinion
"So long as the rules of practice fixed by the Leg-
islature accord with the proper and effective admims-
tration of justice, they should be, and they are, followed
to the letter. Where, however, a situation arises in
which the administration of justice is impaired or the
general rules of practice are unworkable, the duty un-
doubtedly rests on the courts to draw upon the reserve
of their inherent power, not in the assertion of a
domination over other co-ordinate branches of govern-
In Clarke v. Robinson, 159 Ky. 33, 166 S.W 801 (1914), the
Court cited as authority for its holding Graham v. Graham, 113 Ky.
743, 24 Ky L. Rep. 20, 67 S.W 1004 (1902), and Price v. Russell, 154
Ky. 824, 159 S.W 573 (1913).
"274 Ky 263, 118 S.W 2d 547 (1938).
'KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION, sec. 109.
' Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky 263, 267, 118 S.W 2d 547, 549
(1938).
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ment, but in co-operation with the legislative and
executive branches to carry out the purposes of the
Constitution."' -
This is a case in which adherence to the Code would
prevent carrying into effect the provisions of the "General
tRegistration and Purgation Act.''12 where thirty days must
elapse before the mandate of the Court shall issue. Under that
act a house to house canvass "shall be made during the first
two weeks of the sixty day period next preceding the date
upon which the primary is to be held." Tins period had
already started to run when the decision was handed down, and
it would have expired before the mandate could issue under
section 760 of the Code.
We find no equivocation or apologies in the words of
Chief Justice Stites, nor is there reason for either. However,
The Chief Justice cited as a precedent Clark v Robnnson and
explained the Court's position saying, "Deference for a valid
act of the General Assembly which has become a law of the
Commonwealth clearly requires that we exert our own power
to make it effective even though in so doing we contravene a
rule of practice generally accepted as binding."' 3
In the opinion of Justice Thomas in Commonwealth ex rel.
Atty. Gen. v F2rste4 handed down in 194:1, the opinion in
Burton v. Mayer is quoted in part. However, it is to be noted
that the question in that case, according to the construction of
the Court, involved a conflict between section 760 of the Code
and section 124 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky 15 That case approved the holding in Burtom v.
Mayer, nevertheless.
It is well to mention also that the Court in searching the
Kentucky Constitution was unable to find any provision in it
either directing or permitting the General Assembly to pre-
'274 Ky. 263, 267, 118 S.W 2d 547, 549-550 (1938).
'SKy. R. S. (1946) 117.530 (1)
' Burton v Mayer, 274 Ky. 263, 267, 118 S.W 2d 547, 550
(1938)
"288 Ky. 631, 157 S.W 2d 59 (1941).
'KY. CONST. sec. 124: "The Clerks of the Court of Appeals, Cir-
cuit and County Clerks, shall be removable from office by the
Court of Appeals, upon information and good cause shown. The
Court shall be the judge of the facts as well as the law. Two-thirds
of the members present must concur in the sentence."
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scribe rules for the Court's procedure. And in Commonwealt&
ex rel. Atty. Gen v Furste, the Court in its opinion said fur-
ther
"However, for the purpose of preserving uniformity
of procedure and thereby prevent confusion in the
practice, together with the further fact that the Court
itself has not prescribed its own set of rules affecting
the practice under consideration, this court has um-
formly followed in the ordinary run of cases the en-
acted court rules as embodied in the respective Codes
of Practice and by acquiescence has approved them and
will no doubt continue to do so until modification
should be attempted, if ever."10
Thus in 1941 we find the Court of Appeals denying
without reservation the power of the General Assembly to
prescribe the rules of practice and procedure in the courts of
this Commonwealth.
It is interesting to note that in 1944 the General Assembly
recognized the power of the Court to set aside provisions of the
Code when it provided, by amending the statute regarding the
contesting of elections, 17 that the Court might issue its mandate
immediately after announcing its decision.
That is the law in Kentucky as it is today on the question
of the Court's disregarding provisions of the Code. Except in
cases in which the provisions of the Code have been set aside
as preventing or hindering the Court in conforming to pro-
visions of the Kentucky Constitution, the Court has disregarded
the Code only where failure to do so would result in totally
defeating the purposes of the law as adjudged by the Court in
the case wherein its decision was made.
J. PELAM JOHNSTON
:'288 Ky. 631, 635, 157 S.W 2d 59, 61 (1941).
KY. R. S. (1946) 122.090.
